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We argue in this paper that cancelling the debt of the poorest countries was a good 
thing, but that it should not imply that the debt instrument should be foregone. Debt and 
debt cancellations are indeed two complementary instruments which, if properly 
managed, perform better than either loans or grants taken in isolation. The core of the 
intuition, which we develop in a simple two-period model, relates to the fact that the 
poorest countries are also the most volatile, so that contingent facilities, explicitly 
incorporating debt cancellation mechanisms, are a valuable instrument.  
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1 Introduction 
Suppose a DAC donor earmarks US$1  billion of taxpayers’ money for official 
development assistance (ODA). The donor may use two instruments as an outright grant 
or in combination with a market loan to produce a concessional loan of US$2 billion 
with a percentage grant element of 50 per cent. Many nowadays think the choice should 
be clear: provide grants only, leave loans to the market. Since its inception in the 1980s, 
the developing country debt crisis has marked a dramatic watershed in ODA, as it 
brought home the fact that ODA loans had accumulated into unsustainable debt and thus 
called into question the use of loans to finance development.  
After 2000, the grants-versus-loans  controversy developed when an influential US 
Congress Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (better 
known as Meltzer Commission; see IFIAC 2000) concluded that total cancellation of 
poor-country debt was essential. One of the conclusions of the Meltzer Commission on 
reforming the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was that development 
assistance should be administered through performance-based grants rather than 
(concessionary, or soft) loans. Under this system, grants would be disbursed not directly 
to the government, but to a nongovernmental organization (NGO), charity, or private-
sector business that would offer the cheapest bid for a project. These recommendations 
were echoed in US President Bush’s proposal in 2001 during the negotiations for the 
13th IDA replenishment that 50 per cent of IDA financing to poor countries should take 
the form of direct grants.  
The heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) debt reduction initiative has been seen as 
proof of failure of the soft loan strategy. The international agreement on debt relief 
(Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, or MDRI) reached by the G-8 finance ministers in 
mid-2005 followed suit, cancelling US$56.5 billion in loans owed to the World Bank, 
African Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund. At Gleneagles the heads 
of state formally endorsed the agreement made by their finance ministers. Fourteen 
countries in Africa and four in Latin America became eligible for immediate debt 
forgiveness under the plan, and a further nine should benefit over the next few years. 
One thing, however, is to agree on cancelling the debt, and another one is to consider 
that the instrument should be foregone. Although paradoxical at first glance, we shall 
argue in this paper that debt and debt cancellations are two complementary instruments 
which, if properly managed, perform better than either loans or grants taken in isolation. 
The core of our intuition relates to the fact that the poorest countries are also the most 
volatile, so that contingent facilities, explicitly incorporating debt cancellation 
mechanisms, are a valuable instrument.  
The sequel of the paper comes as follows. We first review critically a few of the 
arguments weighting grants against lending to the poorest countries, notably the 
incentive effects of each instrument. We then address what we regard as the most 
serious criticism against loans, namely the issue of ‘defensive lending’. If lenders had to 
refinance by themselves their loans to the poorest countries, then it is clear that the 
instrument is equivalent to a grant. We show econometrically that this has not been the 
case in general. Defensive lending is an occasional, not a systematic feature, of loans to 
the poorest countries.  2 
We then offer a simple theoretical model to show that the equivalence between loans 
and grants that is assumed or demonstrated in a number of papers (Lerrick and Meltzer 
2002, in particular) only holds if the country has access to fully fledged financial 
markets. When this is not the case, we show that soft loans incorporating debt 
cancellations mechanisms perform better than grants only or loans only. Our paper 
builds upon similar intuitions to the paper by Cordella and Ulku (2004), although our 
framework focuses on the role of uncertainty which is absent in their framework. 
We finally present one of the lending scheme that could be applied to the poorest 
countries and calibrate the cost that would have to be borne by the creditors, were they 
to incorporate a contingencies clause in their lending strategy. 
2  Overview of arguments  
2.1 Efficiency 
Are grants more efficient than loans in fighting poverty? A number of papers have 
addressed this question, with no obvious answers so far. Nunnenkamp, Thiele and 
Wilfer (2005) conduct a simple correlation analysis to explore whether loans and grants 
have different impacts on economic growth. They look, on the one hand, at the relation 
between total net ODA, total net loans, total grants and the grant element in ODA 
commitments (computed as the product of the grant element as defined in DAC 
statistics and ODA commitments), and, on the other, average per capita growth in gross 
national income over the subsequent five years. Their analysis finds no substantial 
difference in the impact on economic growth between ODA distributed through grants 
and ODA distributed through loans.  
Second, it is interesting to ask how ODA relates to local fiscal discipline. Since grants 
need not be repaid, they entail a potential disincentive on the mobilization of public 
revenues and on the quality of public spending. Increased dependency on external aid 
may result. In principle, loan repayments should help build financial discipline and 
promote the efficient use of funds. Before moving to empirical results, however, the 
whole theoretical argument needs to be qualified. In a dynamic framework in which 
beneficiary countries rely on the continuation of grants and in which development 
institutions are keen on producing a given level of ODA, the incentive structure is more 
complex. For example, if the renewal of a grant can be credibly tied to a given level of 
financial discipline in the recipient country, then the aforementioned disincentive is 
offset by the positive incentive of having the flow of grants renewed. However, ‘grant 
pushing’ behaviour by development institutions might again weaken that incentive. 
More than a grants-versus-loans issue, this is another version of Buchanan’s (1975) 
Samaritan’s dilemma. 
Odedokun (2003), using yearly panel data from 1970 to 1999 for 72 ODA beneficiaries, 
finds that concessional loans are typically associated with higher fiscal revenues, lower 
public consumption, higher investment rates and lower dependency of the public deficit 
on external financing. In poor countries, a higher level of grants in total ODA is 
associated with a lower tax effort. Gupta et al. (2004) look at a set of 107 countries that 
benefited from ODA between 1970 and 2000, assessing the impact of grants and loans 
on the domestic fiscal effort. They find that an increase in total ODA (sum of grants and 
concessional loans) leads to a decline in fiscal receipts in the beneficiary country. 3 
McGillivray and Ahmed (1999) and Sugema and Chowdhury (2005) reach similar 
conclusions using data from the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively. However, 
Gupta et al. (2004) also look at the differential impact of grants and loans, finding that 
an increase in grants translates into lower receipts: 28 cents of each additional $1 grant 
are offset by a reduction in the fiscal effort. Conversely, loans tend to be associated with 
increased government revenue. In countries with weak institutions, additional grants are 
completely offset by a reduction in domestic revenues (see also Clements et al. 2004).  
In summary, the argument according to which loans are equivalent to grants is not 
warranted from these analyses, at least from the point of view of the incentives that each 
instrument carries.  
2.2 Defensive  lending 
Another powerful line of reasoning against loans relates to the institutional incapacity of 
the poorest countries to fulfil their financial commitments. According to Bulow and 
Rogoff (2005), this institutional weakness is also the simplest way for explaining the 
lack of access to international financial markets.  
Bulow and Rogoff cite a study conducted by the American Congressional Budget 
Office, according to which the market value of the debt for the multilateral banks is 
markedly lower than par. In other words, according to this line of argument, the reason 
why the poor countries have no access to the international financial markets is the same 
one as that explaining why the loans of multilateral banks are non-recoverable.  
Lerrick and Meltzer (2002) as well as Radelet (2005) argue similarly that loans carry 
perverse incentives, in particular linked to the pressures on creditors to make new loans 
to allow countries to repay old ones, whereas grants can be devised to generate positive 
incentives. Contrary to loans, grants do not contribute to debt overhang. Bulow and 
Rogoff sum up this last point in the following way: ‘multilateral development banks 
sometimes have their own internal pressures to pump out loans, inducing politically 
fragile developing countries to take unwanted debt.’ According to this argument, thanks 
to the grants, the multilateral agencies would not be obliged to weaken poor countries, 
for lack of adequate instruments. Defensive lending, which obliges the lenders 
themselves to refinance the loans when they come due is, under this analysis, the 
necessary outcome of lending to the poorest countries. When defensive lending became 
the norm, debt had to be written down. Which is why, again following the reasoning 
behind the Meltzer commission, cancelling debt was a good thing, on the condition 
never to lend again.  
It is clear that defensive lending, if a fact, would hamper the relevance of loans to the 
poorest countries. If debt service had to be constantly refinanced by the creditors 
themselves, then in reality they would be not different from grants. It is this issue that 
we now test econometrically.  
2.3  An econometric test 
In order to shed light on the relevance and significance of defensive lending, we present 
an econometric analysis relative to the borrowing policies conducted by the private 
sector, the bilateral and the multilateral agencies respectively. The matter we want to 4 
tackle here is the part of defensive lending granted by each of these groups to their clients. 
We measure the extent to which new loans (in gross terms) are explained by debt service 
of the debt. Our analysis follows Marchesi and Missale (2004) (although they reason only 
in net terms). We also investigate the extent to which grants by bilaterals are a substitute 
to defensive lending.  
The data that we use are the following. Grants and loans are obtained from the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Debt service is calculated from the database 
of the Global Development Finance produced by the World Bank. The data ‘political 
rights’ and ‘civil liberty’ which we also control for, come from the Global Development 
Network Growth Database. We regress gross loans upon debt service and take the value 
of the coefficient as a measure of defensive lending. We also control for (the lagged value 
of) the debt-to-GDP ratio (Ldebt), the (lagged value) of grants-to-GDP, population growth 
(population), lagged GDP growth (LGDP Growth), lagged inflation (Linflation), lagged 
political rights and civil liberties. Lagged values are meant to avoid endogeneity 
problems. We take political rights and civil liberties as proxies for governance indices.  
The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the amount of defensive 
lending that took place for all three private, bilateral and multilateral lenders, over the 
period 1980-2004. Private lenders are the least concerned, with less than 3 per cent of 
their loans that can be interpreted as defensive loans. Then come the bilateral lenders with 
a ratio which is three times higher. Finally the multilateral lenders experience a defensive 
lending ratio which is again three times the level of the bilaterals, at about 30 per cent.  
Table 1 
Comparative defensive lending, 1980-2004 






      






















































Time and country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1326  1325  1326 
Wald 1023  3174  1713 
Note:  GLS regression with time and country fixed effects, panel-specific heteroscedasticity and AR(1); 
t-statistics in parentheses; * is 90 per cent; ** is 95 per cent; *** is 99 per cent significance level. 5 
Table 2 
Evolution of defensive lending and grants 
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Time and country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1326 1325 1326  899 
Wald 906  2903  1638  60 
Note:  GLS regression with time and country fixed effects, panel-specific heteroscedasticity and AR(1); 
t-statistics in parentheses; * is 90 per cent; ** is 95 per cent; *** is 99 per cent significance level. 
Table 2 breaks down the ratios over three time horizons: 1980s, 1990s and 2000-05 
which we call, for simplicity, the 2000s. The picture is slightly different. All three 
lenders eventually experienced some defensive lending, but at different time horizons. 
Private lenders were concerned in the 1980s, multilateral lenders in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
These econometric results point to a simple conclusion. Defensive lending has taken 
place across all classes of creditors. Altogether, however, they do not appear to be an 
intrinsic and repeated feature of lending to poor countries nor to have exceeded about 
one-third of the debt service involved. There is no intrinsic capture of the creditors by 
their debtors. On the other hand, creditors do have to refinance loans when under 
financial stress. This feature points to the need of contingency clauses more than to 
foregoing the instrument itself. 
3  A theoretical framework 
Bulow and Rogoff argue that that the poorest countries have no access to the financial 
markets for lack of proper institutions which, in their view, is the very reason why they 6 
should not have access to soft loans either. There is however another explanation as to 
why poor countries have no access to the international financial markets: it is the fact 
that their economies are too volatile. Financial markets do not handle well economic 
volatility when it comes to sovereign creditors. The lack of efficient procedures for 
settling debts in case of bad shocks makes it difficult to cancel debt when needed. 
Financial crises are more frequent than smooth resolutions of debt problem. Private 
loans to developing countries have de facto not helped to smooth per capita 
consumption but tended to increase the volatility of consumption (Reisen and Maltzan 
1999) in poor countries. Kharroubi (2005) shows how volatility does tend to exclude 
poor countries from international financial markets. 
In the model that we present below, exclusion from the financial markets will be the 
outcome of two features: poor institutions and high volatility. In this context, we 
explore the conditions under which grants and loans are not equivalent and draw policy 
implications for the design of soft loans.  
3.1 The  setting1 
Consider an open country in a two-period framework. The country considers an 
investment I1 in period 1. We suppose that there are two states of nature in period 2. In 
the favourable state, the return to the investment will be Q+; in the unfavourable state, 
Q- (with Q+>Q-). We suppose further that the unfavourable state occurs with probability 
p < 1. The world risk-free interest rate is r. 
In such a framework, the investment will be socially profitable if and only if: 
() − + + − ≤ + pQ Q p r 1 ) 1 ( I1  (1) 
In what follows, we assume that this condition is satisfied.  
Let us now assume that the country finances I1 through its own financing capacity Q1 in 
period 1 and through a debt D1 contracted in period 1 from outside investors, such that:  
1 1 1 I D Q = +  
Let us assume that the country suffers from weak institutions and governance problems 
and that these translate into an institutional capacity  [] 1 , 0 ∈ λ  to repay the debt. λ  can 
be interpreted as the recoverable part of any investment by the foreign investor. 
The debt can then be repaid (on average) if and only if:  
() () − + + − ≤ + Q p Q p r D λ λ 1 1 1  
Let us call  ρ  the risk-adjusted interest rate on debt D1. Foreign investors will thus 
require a payment of R = D1(1+ ρ ) in period 2.  
                                                 
1   This section draws on Cohen and Portes (2005). 7 
If  − ≤ Q R λ , the country is solvent and can borrow at the risk-free rate (r =  ρ ). 
If  + − ≤ < Q R Q λ λ , the country will not be able to repay the debt should the 
unfavourable state of nature occur. We suppose that in such a case the country defaults. 
Investors will be willing to finance D1 at a rate  ρ  such that: 
() () ( ) ρ + − = + 1 1 1 1 1 D p r D  
This implies that () () ( ) r p + = − + 1 1 1 ρ , and  p r + ≅ ρ . 
Finally, let us suppose that the country has no financing capacity in period 1 (Q1 = 0). 
The investment will be possible if and only if: 
() () p Q r I − ≤ + + 1 1 1 λ  
Given λ  and p, it is thus perfectly possible that a socially profitable investment—i.e., an 
investment verifying (1) above—will not be financed. 
In the following, we assume  () () p Q r I − > + + 1 1 1 λ  so that I1, which we suppose to be 
socially profitable, will not be undertaken if it were to be financed by the financial 
markets alone. We ask how development aid can help solve this inefficiency. 
3.2  The (non-) equivalence between grants and loans  
A first option consists in making a grant G1 to the country. G1 will finance part of the 
investment (thus contributing to the country’s own financing capacity) and is chosen so 
as to make I1-G1 financeable by the financial markets. The grant G1 will thus be chosen 














A second option consists in making a loan I1, knowing that the country will default in 
the unfavourable state of nature. Such a loan will thus repay  () p Q − + 1 λ . It will 
therefore cost an amount exactly equivalent to G1. In such a setting, the loan and grant 
equivalence is obtained. This is the core of Lerrick and Meltzer’s argument. 
Suppose, however, that donors tailor the subsidized loan to the unfavourable state of 
nature and therefore ask for a repayment  − = Q R λ . In such a scenario, the country will 
be able to service its debt in both states of nature. The subsidized loan needed to make 
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+
 8 
It then follows that if  () − + < − Q p Q 1 , G´<G. A subsidized loan is to be preferred to a 
grant. In this case the equivalence between loans and grants is broken: soft loans (with 
susbsidized rates) are superior to grants.  
Let us emphasize the reasons behind this result. The non equivalence comes from the 
fact that financial markets are imperfect, in the sense that they are not able to supply 
state-contingent securities. Subsidized loans, to the extent that they allow the country to 
repay the debt in all states of nature, circumvent, in part this deficiency. This is why 
they can then work better than a combination of loans and grants. Clearly, however, the 
best solution would be to design a loan whose service is contingent on the state of 
nature, namely: 
() ρ + = + 1 1 D R  when Q+ occurs, and  − − = Q R λ  in case of Q- . 
If private creditors are able to design such loans, then the equivalence between loans 
and grants would be restored. (Note that in the framework of Cordella and Ulku 2004, 
the countries do not gain access to the financial markets so that the question does not 
arise in their model). If developing agencies stand in a better position than private 
markets to devise contingent loans, i.e., if their comparative advantage lies in their 
ability to write down the debt when needed, then state-contingent loans are once again 
superior to grants. 
3.3 Lessons   
In the model that we have examined, developing countries’ insufficient access to 
international capital markets relates both to the volatility of their resources and to their 
lack of institutional commitments. High volatility translates into higher spreads which 
limit borrowing capacity. Some socially productive investments may then not be 
spontaneously financed. In such a framework, the equivalence between loans and grants 
does not hold, when the market is unable to provide adequate state-contingent debt. 
Solving these market failures should be part of the aid donors’ mission. 
Debt cancellation of poorest countries, such as the one engineered after the HIPC 
Initiative, far from being bad news, may on the contrary reveal the comparative 
advantage of development agencies. The international financial markets indeed suffer 
from not having transparency procedures for debt cancellation. Debt and debt 
cancellation should instead be thought as complementary instruments, rather than 
substitutes.  
4  A new vehicle for lending to the poorest countries 
4.1  How to handle the volatility of poor countries 
Let us focus on vulnerability to external shocks as a major factor which should be 
addressed by lenders to poor countries. Natural resource price volatility has long been 
recognized as a major source of vulnerability for developing countries. There is ample 
evidence of the negative impact of export instability and of economic volatility on 
economic growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995). While the problem has long been known 9 
and understood, and despite several attempts, the international community has failed so 
far to provide a practical solution. Measures to stabilize natural resource export prices 
have failed in the face of the high and persistent costs of the distortions thus created, 
given the evolution of markets. Mechanisms such as the Stabex2 were conceived to 
provide counter-cyclical relief. In practice, however, they worked rather pro-cyclically 
and did not achieve their objectives (Collier et al. 1999).  
The nature of the shocks is one of the critical features that make them difficult to 
manage. Price shocks have tended to be permanent rather than cyclical. This is also one 
of the reasons why ad hoc debt rescheduling has often left debtor countries with an 
increasing debt burden that eventually became too heavy, as such operations were based 
on the false hope that higher prices and a more lenient economic environment would 
eventually bail out overly indebted countries. 
Guillaumont et al. (2003) usefully discuss several ways to use ODA to dampen the 
impact of price shocks. A first option consists in explicitly linking yearly repayments to 
the state of nature by automatic adjustment of the public debt service to the evolution of 
export prices: reduced debt service during crises, faster repayment during booms. In a 
similar spirit, Gilbert and Varangis (2005) call for explicit loan indexation on prime 
material prices.3 
An interesting idea, also explored by Guillaumont et al. (2003), consists in using the 
subsidy element embedded in concessional loans to finance cushioning. The central 
repayment scheme might be based on constant annuities, but the loan would be 
associated with contingent grants provided in response to a temporary exogenous 
negative shock that would partly cover debt service. Such grants would be financed by a 
reduction in the primary loan concessionality, which means that the implied subsidy on 
the loan interest rate would be lower or the amortization period shorter. If no shock 
occurs during the amortization period, the associated grant might be used in whole or in 
part to cover the last payments under strict economic policy conditionality (to provide 
some incentive for sound management of any price booms).  
4.2  A new lending strategy 
Cohen, Fally and Villemot (2004) propose a medium-term solution that consists in 
smoothing out export revenues across a moving average of the previous five years, thus 
providing a cushion without leaning against the winds of long-run trends. Such idea 
could easily be applied towards adding a price indexation formula to concessional ODA 
loans. For example, creditors might monitor the difference between previous price 
averages and current prices. When that difference exceeds a given level, loan 
repayments could be either accelerated or reduced. Following these ideas, we have 
                                                 
2   The Stabex was set up in 1976 by the European Community under the Lomé Convention and was 
discontinued in 1980. It was a system of compensatory finance to stabilize African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries’ agricultural export earnings. Below a given reference threshold, a developing 
country would receive from the Stabex mechanism a financial transfer to cover the difference between 
the threshold and actual export receipts. 
3  Donors are currently experimenting with similar ideas. For example, the Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD) recently made a loan to a cotton company in an African country whose 
maturity depends on cotton prices. 10 
calibrated a simple lending strategy. We investigate the cost of cancelling (rather than 
refinancing) the service of the debt in all instances where the value of exports falls 
below x per cent of their moving averages over the past five years. We show the range 
of results when the threshold x varies from 95 per cent to 75 per cent.  
We present in Table 3 the simulations results which are obtained when taking the set of 
IDA-only countries where the Agence Française de Développement intervenes. The 
simulations are based on past performances of these countries, during the period 
1975-2005. On average, one obtains that a fraction representing 35 per cent of the loans 
would have to be foregone, were the debt service of debt to be cancelled whenever the 
level of exports fall below the 95 per cent threshold. The worst-case scenario is with 
Burundi, where the occurrence would have reached 62 per cent. Even this worst-case 
scenario, however, is within the range of grant elements incorporated in loans to the 
poorest countries (which is on average about two-thirds of the face value of loans). 
There is therefore room for tailoring contingent loans whose grant elements would 
amount in providing automatic debt relief to the indebted country in time of distress. 
Table 3 
Occurrence of shocks, 1975-2003 
Cases (in % of total number of years) when exports fall  
below x% of their moving averages of the past five years 
Threshold  x 95% 90% 85% 80%  75% 
       
Bangladesh  14  14 7 3  3 
Benin  31  10 7 3  3 
Bolivia  31 17 14  3 0 
Burkina  Faso  34 24 21 10 7 
Burundi  62 52 41 34  14 
Cameroon  28 17 17  7 0 
CAR  48 41 28 21 7 
Chad  41 38 21 14  10 
Côte  d'Ivoire  41 28 14 10 7 
Gambia  31 14 14  7 0 
Haiti  24 21 10 10  10 
India  3 0 0 0  0 
Kenya  28 21 10  7 0 
Madagascar  24 21 21 14  14 
Malawi  41 24 17  7 0 
Mali  14  14 3 0  0 
Mauritania  48 31 17  3 0 
Niger  48 31 28 24  17 
Nigeria  38 31 24 21  17 
PNG  31 28 21 10 3 
Rwanda  45 41 38 31  17 
Senegal  34 24 14  3 0 
Sierra  Leone  59 55 48 41  31 
Togo  41 34 24 24  14 
        
Average  35 26 19 13 7 11 
4.3 Implementation 
This discussion leads us to advocate a scheme in which the ODA subsidy involved in 
concessional ODA loan would be used to adapt the service of the debt to the shock 
pattern that debtor countries face so that debt solvency is maintained. We calibrated a 
simulation based on exports, but the same idea could be applied to a mechanism which 
depends upon the price of a basket commodities representative of the country’s exports. 
This would allow for a swifter mechanism. One could go beyond these ideas, and allow 
for a judgment of the lending agencies themselves, as to when it is appropriate to cancel 
debt service.  
One way of implementing these ideas would be to get multilateral and bilateral4 
development institutions to build up reserves that would allow them to cancel debt 
service when the country is in a bad state of nature. Such reserves would be calibrated 
to cover risks related to shocks in natural resource prices and to natural disasters facing 
developing countries. They could use part of the grant element to finance the build-up in 
reserves.  
However they may be implemented, these ideas face several institutional constraints, 
both in terms of the way the DAC is currently accounting for ODA and with regard to 
accounting standards such as the new International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Reserves, for instance, so long as they are undisbursed, are not counted for as 
ODA, which usually requires a spending item in the public budget. The same issue 
arises with guarantees. Time is ripe for debate and possible change of outdated ODA 
accounting conventions. 
Moral hazard stands as another important issue that needs to be addressed. Any debt 
cancellation scheme introduces a bias in favour of debtor countries. The risk is that of 
transferring resources from properly managed countries that honour their debt 
commitments towards those that fail to do so. Indeed, experience with debt reduction 
under the HIPC Initiative illustrates that risk. ODA flows seem to have benefited the 
most indebted countries rather than the neediest ones, even if there is no evidence that 
debt relief has had any significant crowding-out effect on other aid flows (Powell 2003); 
and there seems to be no correlation between debt reduction and either the level of 
poverty (Cohen and Vellutini 2004) or the quality of governance.  
The schemes that we propose, however, offer a possibility of significantly reducing the 
level of moral hazard involved. For one thing, the debt cancellation mechanism, if based 
on world prices only, cannot usually be manipulated by the country.  
One can also imagine that countries, which have not depleted the reserves committed to 
them, could use them at the end of the loan in order to shorten the life of their debt. 
There would be no cross subsidies across countries, which is a problem, but this would 
have the merit of incentive compatibility.  
Third, the amount of ‘sleeping’ reserves committed to each country depends on the 
threshold that is chosen. This threshold need not be the same across countries. It could 
be chosen out of an explicit and transparent assessment of the country risk and thus calls 
                                                 
4  Development institutions that make bilateral loans (such as AFD) already provision country risk. 12 
attention to country specifics and policies. To give a practical example, one could 
conduct a detailed country risk analysis and classify developing countries in four 
groups, calling respectively for reserves amounting to 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 75 per 
cent or 100 per cent of debt, each with a corresponding threshold based on past 
experiences. In the first group, considered as exceptional, a provision of 100 units 
would allow a loan of 400 units; in the second, the same provision would allow a loan 
of 200 units; in the third, 133 (=100/75). The fourth and last group would require 
outright grants. Countries with poor institutions and governance would belong to that 
group, for which the arguments presented by Bulow and Rogoff (2005) are valid. 
Such a scheme also calls for a much tighter coordination between multilateral and 
bilateral donors. There is a collective action problem in dealing with debt reduction, 
since it is in no creditor’s interest to move first lest its move facilitate repayment to 
other creditors. It is interesting to compare our proposal with IDA14 provisions for 
2005-08. IDA plans to allocate one-third of its resources to outright grants rather than 
highly concessional loans. A country might qualify for IDA loans provided that its debt 
remains within preset debt sustainability criteria established by the World Bank and the 
IMF. These criteria identify debt thresholds of 100 per cent, 200 per cent or 300 per cent 
of exports, depending on the institutional risk as measured by the World Bank’s country 
policy and institutional assessment (CPIA). When the debt is too high, the country 
qualifies for grants instead. In order to avoid penalizing a solvent country as compared 
to an insolvent one, IDA14 has decided to cut its grants by a discount factor of 20 per 
cent (or 9 per cent in a major post-conflict situation). The discount is supposed to limit 
moral hazard in that it penalizes a country that purposely lets its debt grow astray.  
Our scheme is based on similar principles, but proceeds in a more systematic fashion. 
The leverage factor allowed in loans is grounded on constituting provisions that 
correspond directly to the grant element of international aid. The more solvent a country 
(i.e., the more it is able to build its institutions so as to honour its debts), the higher the 
possible leverage. Instead of a fixed discount, our proposed solution uses a progressive 
scale depending on the quality of the country’s governance. 
Conclusion: beyond grants versus loans, towards modern development finance 
The basic message of our paper is that the grants-versus-loans debate as it was cast 
during the IDA13 replenishment has been misleading and largely irrelevant. It came in a 
context where most multilateral and, even more, bilateral ODA was already delivered as 
outright grants. It broadly disregarded financial and economic analysis and reached one-
sided conclusions that do not fit well with empirical observations. By putting the focus 
on ODA instruments, however, it has helped to raise awareness about the link between 
such instruments and aid effectiveness. Our main conclusion is that there is a rationale 
for loans as effective ODA delivery mechanisms and that there is also a rationale for 
development institutions to provide concessional loans.  
One of the shortcomings of past loans was that risks were insufficiently taken into 
account and that the typical ODA instrument was too archaic to adapt to the solvency 
constraint of a poor country that is highly sensitive to external shocks. Modern ODA 
should build on the capacity of donors to use a wide range of financial instruments, 
from direct subsidies to market loans, guarantees, and state contingent debt. The key 13 
and the originality, therefore, lie in mixing taxpayers’ money with a number of financial 
instruments, in a flexible and innovative manner. This is, of course, a major departure 
from the conventional conception of ODA instruments as either direct grants or 
concessional loans.  
One obstacle, as mentioned above, lies with the current accounting definition of ODA, 
which, because of the necessity for public communication concerning the ODA figure, 
conditions both the nature of the ODA instruments that can be used and their 
destination. The time has come to open up the statistical definition so as to make full 
use of the potential of ODA and increase its efficiency. The debate is only getting under 
way and needs to be pursued within the donor community, notably within the DAC 
coordination framework. 
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